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Re-Considering Essentialism for Feminist
Composition Pedagogy: Adrienne Rich's
"Politics of Location" as a
Theory of Writerly Agency
Krista Ratcliffe
If a feminist calls you an essentialist, you've just been insulted.
Catherine Stimpson

For two consecutive years the 4Cs program committee has invited
me to participate in panels sporting the word essentialism in the title.
Although grateful for the invitations, I am perplexed because neither
of my paper proposals mentioned this word. I am troubled too. For
at the mere hint of the word essentialism, I hear warning voices ringing
in my head. Specifically, I hear the voice of Catherine Stimpson, who
uttered the above truism to a crowd of Stephens College women in
Columbia, Missouri. But if I have learned anything in our profession,
I have learned that such truisms should continually be questioned.
So if I question rather than heed the warning voices in my head, I
recognize that they, as well as my responses to the 4Cs programming
committees, not only reinforce a static essentialist/anti·essentialist
binary, but also assume that the question of essentialism has been
closed. And such a question should remain in question because
teachers' assumptions about essentialism (un)consciously drive their
pedagogical practices; for example, assumptions about essentialism
enable teachers to believe that writing can (not) be taught or that
learning with (in) language can(not) change students' lives. To keep
the question of essentialism in play, I want to accept Devoney Looser's
challenge in "Composing as an 'Essentialist'?":
It is not so much that so·called "essentialist" work must be
stopped than that it must be questioned for its historical and
cultural assumptions and its assumptions about the category "women." Only then will we be able to talk about feminist composition theory that not only operates "in a different voice" but with
voices that more productively accommodate questions of
difference. (66)
To explore Looser's challenge, I will re-consider the concept of
essentialism, i.e., its definitions and their political expediencies in terms
of feminism. Second, I will re-read Adrienne Rich's "politics of
location" as a theory of writerly agency, foregrounding its reconsidera-
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tion of essentialism. And third, I will re-imagine Rich's theory of
writerly agency as the basis for a, not the, feminist composition
pedagogy.
Re-Consldering Essentialism
Feminists and non-feminists alike have been debating the question
of essentialism for decades, if not centuries. In the past few years,
however, feminist theorists have grappled anew with this debate, trying
to define the conceptual category 'woman" so that real historical
women can avoid biological determinism and promote political action.
In Essentially Speaking, Diana Fuss reldndles the essentialist/constructionist debate by challenging Aristotle's influential definition of
essence t and employing John Locke's distinction between real essentialism and nominal essentialism to further her cause. 2 Fuss aligns
Aristotle with Locke's real essentialism, "a belief in the real, true
essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the
'what ness' of a given entity" (Fuss xi). She associates constructionists
with Locke's nominal essentialism, a belief that essence is a linguistic
construction, "a classificatory fiction we need to categorize and to
label" (Fuss 4). Unlike Locke, Fuss claims that all real essentialisms
are actually nominal ones (5).3 But Fuss's revisions still position us
within the debate about essentialism, and from that position she asks
us to consider 'whether essences can change and whether construction
can be normative" (6).
These questions are necessary because, if essence is fixed, then
SUbjects are trapped within static structural boundaries and such
entrapment leads us down the slippery slope to biological determinism
and, hence, to the impossibility of personal and/or social change. If
construction can be seen as the order of things, then the slippery slope
disappears and the impossible becomes the possible. But when asldng
'whether essences can change and whether construction can be
normative; we must also ask: can feminists revise the concept of
essentialism in politically productive ways?
Many feminist theorists are skeptical about redefining essentialism
for feminist projects. Linda A1coff claims that, given the received
history of feminist theory, any discussions of essentialism at this
particular historical moment are just too enmeshed with Aristotelian
assumptions to be of much use: "it is difficult to render the views of
Rich and Daly into a coherent whole without supplying a missing
premise that there is an innate female essence" (412). Judith Butler
echoes A1cofrs skepticism and explains that the desire to supply this
missing premise arises from feminists' fear that any "indeterminacy of
gender might eventually culminate in the failure of feminism" (vii); for
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if we cannot determine what "woman" is, then how can we construct
an -ism to empower her? Butler argues that this fear affects debates
about radical feminisms, which too often center around unanswerable
questions of "origin or cause" of female essence rather than around
critiques of female essence as the "effect of institutions, practices, and
discourses" that write our cultures and ourselves (vii-viii).
Teresa de Lauretis is even more skeptical of the political expediency
of any concept of essentialism; consequently, she refuses to participate
in debates about essentialism, i.e., does it or does it not exist, is it
real or is it nominal, is it immanent and/or is it transcendent. Instead,
de Lauretis asks us to think "Otherwise' (Daly, Wickedary 153) about
the issue. Specifically, de Lauretis asks us to reject the idea that a
missing premise of innate female essence must necessarily be supplied
in radical feminist theories: 'Why do it at all? What is the purpose,
or the gain, of supplying a missing premise (innate female essence) in
order to construct a coherent image of feminism which thus becomes
available to charges (essentialism) based on the very premise that had
to be supplied?' (264). Instead, de Lauretis encourages us to concern
ourselves with:
developing a theory of the female-sexed or female-embodied
social SUbject, whose constitution and whose modes of social
and subjective existence include most obviously sex and gender,
but also race, class, and any other significant sociocultural
divisions and representations; [such) a... theory of the femaleembodied social SUbject [would be) based on its specific,
emergent, and conflictual history. (267)
But other feminist theorists argue that thinking Otherwise about
essentialism need not mean ignoring the debate. By reading all
essentialisms as nominal, Fuss refutes the tradition of real essentialism
and claims that the 'deconstruction of essentialism, rather than putting
essence to rest, simply raises the discussion to a more sophisticated
level' (20); moreover, she concludes by asserting that 'politics emerges
as feminism's essence" (37). Another more sophisticated discussion
about essentialism emerges in French feminist theory. In 'The Laugh
of the Medusa,' Helene Cixous exhorts woman to write (to) woman
and man (to) man. A rereading of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory,
Cixous' exhortation merges the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary
so as to construct woman's body without resorting to either term in
Locke's binary. A frequently misinterpreted redefinition of essentialism
is Mary Daly's refutation of both real and nominal traditions. Daly
argues that essence refers to a 'Self" that is constantly 'becoming' in
the patriarchal "foreground' and the radical feminist 'Background"
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while simultaneously participating in "Becoming" (Daly's conception of
a deity) (Gyn/Ecology 26; Pure Lust 2); these interwoven processes
inextricably interweave immanent and transcendent realms (Pure Lust
60-1). By defining "becoming" as a voyage that leads to both "the
discovety and the creation of a world other than patriarchy," Daly
posits essence as always already in process (Gyn /Ecology 1).4
As demonstrated by Fuss, Cixous, and Daly, essence can be
redefined. When posited not as original, pure, or fixed, but as a
process, essence loses its status as a privileged signifier. As a result,
essentialism need not be considered either a static biological determinism that traps women or a totalizing linguistic game that constructs
them; instead it may be defined as a subject-in-process. This definition
empowers both women and men while recognizing the differences both
between and among them. The implications of such a definition are
enormous. Such an essentialism would allow the signifier to stay in
play while Simultaneously allowing spaces for pOlitical action; or as
Joan Scott claims, "If in our histories we relativize the categories
woman and man, it means, of course, that we must also recognize the
contingent and specific nature of Oll.r political claims" (145). Such a
move does not force us to reject politics nor to embrace an allaccepting pluralism; instead it challenges us to critique our categories,
to question our truths that are based on these categories, and to revise
our actions based on these assumed truths.
Thinking Otherwise about essentialism enables us to read Adrienne
Rich's politics of location as a feminist theory of writerly agency that
constructs a space for identity and for change. Viewed from the site of
composition studies, Rich's feminist theory of writerly agency can
inform a feminist composition pedagogy. Such a pedagogy foregrounds
the functions of gender as it intersects with other categories (e.g., race,
class, sexual orientation, nationality); as such, it attempts to empower
real historical students, particularly real historical women students, by
helping them to recognize their own politics of location and negotiate
such positions.
Re-Reading Rich's "Politics of Location" as a Theory of Writerly
Agency
Rich posits a pOlitics of location that may be read as assuming an
essence-in-process. She describes her own location as follows: "I need
to understand how a place on the map is also a place in history within
which as a woman, a Jew, a lesbian, a feminist 1 am created and trying
to create" ("Notes Toward a Politics of Location" 212). But such a
location is not a simple identity politics with neat, unblurred catego-
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ries. Instead, it is immeasurably complex, as exemplified when Rich
critiques her previous statement:
... the woman trying to fit racism and class into a strictly radicalfeminist analysis finds that the box won't pack. The woman who
seeks the experiential grounding of identity politics realizes that
as Jew, white, woman, lesbian, middle-class, she herself is a
complex identity: her U.S. passport, in this world, is part of her
body, and she lives under a very specific patriarchy. (Blood,
Bread, and Poetry xii)
Rich analyzes this complexity in order to define her own subjectivity,
and in the process she discovers that these definitions change from
year to year, day to day, essay to essay, poem to poem. Thus, if we
read these categories not as real or nominal essentialisms but as
interwoven essences that are becoming, then Rich's politics of location
emerges as a space of writerly agency.
This writerly agency does not presume an autonomous will that can
single-handedly overcome structural oppression; neither does it
presume a human subject relegated only to a discursive position. What
it does presume is a space of limited agency where a woman can make
choices. One Rich persona is optimistic about this agency and its
possible choices: "Wben / I speak of an end to suffering I don't mean
anesthesia. I mean know- / ing the world, and my place in it, not in
order to stare with bitter- / ness or detachment, but as a powerful and
womanly series of / choices ...: ("Sources; Your Native Land Your Life
4-8). Rich chooses choices carefully, anticipating Rosemary Hennessy's
warning:
Like identity and experience, tbe notion of 'choice,' so embedded
historically in the humanist ideology of the 'free' individual,
cannot simply be invoked [but) has to be rewritten so as to map
out more coherently the mechanisms--both discursive and
nondiscursive--that affect the historical availability of particular
positions to some subjects and not others as well as movements
across and between them. (74)
Thus Rich's politics of location does not ask whether choices exist but
rather what kinds of choices are available at particular locations for
particular subjects.
When considered as a theory of writerly agency, Rich's politics of
location foregrounds gendered possibilities and gendered constraints of
writers' choices, particularly women writers' choices. To make these
possibilities and constraints visible, Rich chooses memory and
geography as controlling metaphOrs of her politics of location.
Memory implies re-vision, both personal and cultural:
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The act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering
an old text from a new critical dimension--is for women more
than a chapter in cultural history: it is an act of survival. Until
we can understand the assumptions in which we are drenched we
cannot know ourselves. And this drive to self-knowledge, for
woman, is more than a search for identity: it is part of her
refusal of the self-destructiveness of male-dominated society.
('When We Dead Awaken' 35)
To emphasize the materiality of this re-visioning memory, Rich links
it to a cultural, textual, and psychological geography: it is 'a difficult
and dangerous walking on ice, as we try to find language and images
for a consciousness we are just coming into, and with little in the past
to support us' (35). This geographical metaphor invokes uncharted
regions of possibility, which are both exciting and harrowing. Combined, the memory and geography metaphOrs identify rhetorical
situations of re-visioning writers as 'borderlands' between past and
present, different interpretations, different truths, and different writers
and readers. Within these borderlands women often confront problems
that men may not: '( think it has been a peculiar confusion to the girl
or woman who tried to write because she is peculiarly susceptible to
language. She goes to poetry or fiction looking for her way of being
in the world ... and over and over in the 'words' masculine persuasive
force' she comes up against something that negates everything she is
about' (39). But this realization does not free women from the
problems of language, for as one Rich persona admits, 'this is the
oppressor's language / yet I need it to talk to you' ('The Burning of
Paper Instead of Children,' Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 2.17-18). Thus, not
content simply to identify these gendered possibilities and constraints
upon women's agency, Rich also analyzes their implications for women
writers in the following ways:
• A woman writer may retreat into the dream of a common language
and try to communicate with other women and men as if they all
shared the same SUbject position in the symbolic, i.e., as if their
politics of location were all identical. Living with(in) such a dream
is not easy for a woman writer, for she frequently fails in her attempts
to communicate from this position. To understand her failure, she
must awaken from this dream, a movement one Rich persona likens
' to wak[ing) from drowning' ('Origins and History of Consciousness,'
The Dream of a Common Language 11.7) .
• Once awakened from the dream of a common language, a woman
writer must resist being relegated to an uneasy, static silence that
denies the reality of her politics of location. That is, she must resist
others' attempts to relegate her to this silence, and she must resist her
THE WRITING INSTRUCTOR WINTER }994

«

b

Krista Ratcliffe 61
own temptation to retreat into this "safe" silence. Even though this
aware-but-mute option appears to be the safest route, it is actually
unhealthy. The unsaid words do not disappear but build up (un)consciously in a woman's mind and body and eventually surface whether
she wants them to or not. So what appears to be the easiest option
is actually "the hardest thing to learn" ("An Unsaid Word," Adrienne
Rich's Poetry 7).
• Because different kinds of silence exist, a woman writer may choose
a silence that is neither uneasy nor static. For example, Rich
celebrates Emily Dickinson's powerful silence: 'you chose I silence for
entertainment, I chose to have it at last I on your own premises" ("I
Am in Danger--Sir--," Adrienne Rich's Poetry 21-24). But such silence
demands a politics of location that affords the luxury of retreating from
the world, and far too many women lack such privilege. Moreover,
romanticizing such silence fosters a belief in an autonomy that is
impossible to achieve and can result in a woman beating herself up for
not being able to attain this impossibility.
• If a woman writer chooses not to be silent, she may opt to repress
her emotions, especially anger, and speak "calmly." This option entails
consciously playing to the logics of the dominant discourses and
downplaying the logics of her particular politiCS of location, although
the two need not be mutually exclusive. Such a move has advantages
as demonstrated by the Rich persona whose brother-in-law just
happens to be a psychiatrist: "If 1 stay within the bounds they can't
come and get me" ("Contradictions," Your Native Land Your Life 4.11).
But this move has disadvantages as well. It means staying within preestablished boundaries that may not allow a woman writer room to
write, speak, or be (sane).
• A woman writer may try to express the different logics that emerge
from her own politics of location, not as a challenge to dominant
logics but as a means of establishing a Rogerian communication with
them. Such a move tries to bridge the gap between men and women,
which "hangs between us I older and stranger than ourselves" ("From
an Old House in America," Adrienne Rich's Poetry 5.7-8). Although
such a gap can never be totally bridged, communication can occur.
But it can be exhausting. And unfortunately, it usually entails writing
and speaking in terms that dominant logics can accept.
• A woman writer may write from her own politics of location,
primarily for herself and secondarily for others. Although Rich
celebrates using a politics of location as a writerly agency, particularly
for developing a strong writerly voice and womanly sense, her
recognition of Emily Dickinson's chosen sile!1ce acknowledges a
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recognition that particular historical moments call for particular actions
for particular people. Moreover, the complexity of a politics of
location complicates what it means to be a woman writer who writes
for herself. For a woman writer has multiple subject positions, and
these positions are not static. Thus, a writing process that would
enable a woman writer to write (to) herself would be constantly
evolving.
How does Rich conceptualize such writing processes? She does not
offer one process every woman writer can employ. Instead she argues
that composing processes are closely linked with each woman writer's
evolving subjectivity. To model this claim, Rich articulates her own
writing process--which celebrates "women trying to speak with women
/ the sUbject is how to break a mold of discourse, / how little by little
minds change / but that they do change... ' ('Turning,' Time's Power
4.8-11). For Rich, breaking the mold of discourse means conceptualizing strategies that have silenced women in the past and discovering other strategies that may be employed in the present and/or future.
Like Paula Becker, a Rich persona claims that ' .. .I'm looking everywhere in nature / for new forms, old forms in new places, / ... / I know
and do not know / what I am searching for' (,Paula Becker to Clara
Westhoff,' The Dream of a Common Language 20-24). Moreover, this
looking is both conscious and unconscious: '[w)ithout for one moment
turning my back on conscious choice and selection, I have been
increasingly willing to let the unconscious offer its materials, to listen
to more than the one voice of a single idea' (,Poetry & Experience,'
Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 89). In addition to disclosing her own interwoven subjectivity and writing process, Rich imagines other processes
that may enable women to write for themselves and for others. But
whatever the particularities of these processes, their purpose is outlined
in her 'Transcendental Etude': 'Such a composition has nothing to do
with eternity, / the striving for greatness, brilliance-- / only with the
musing of a mind / one with her body... / with no mere will to mastery'
(The Dream of a Common Language 165-68, 171). [n four brief lines,
Rich opens up spaces in composition studies, e.g., the space for
musing, not just theorizing; the space of body, not just mind; the space
of discovery, not just mastery; and the space of the historical particular,
not just the a/historical universal.
But Rich warns that such writerly agency has consequences. One
consequence is that a 'thinking woman sleeps with monsters' ('Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law,' Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 3.1). These
monsters can paralyze women with fear, thus reinforcing existing power
structures. Yet these monsters may also be reinterpreted in a way that
motivates women into action, e.g., Comus's Medusa. A second
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consequence is that the myths, lore, theories, rituals and languages that
are so dear to us are suddenly exposed as gendered and sexist and
rendered subject for re-vision; such realizations are often personally
painful. And third, those with vested interests in maintaining such
myths, lore, theories, etc., will fight revisions. What that really means
is that they will fight the women who are doing the re-visioning.
Why? Because as Rich's persona says in 'From an Old House in
America': "Such women are dangerous / to the order of things"
(Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 16.1-2). Or at least they are perceived to be.
Re-Imagining a Feminist Composition Pedagogy
So how does Rich's politics of location as a theory of writerly
agency inform composition pedagogy? It does not posit one writing
process as an a/historical structure that will serve all women. It does
not offer a set syllabus, a set of textbooks, and a sequence of papers
that will guarantee a feminist teacher emerging in the classroom.
What it does provide, as demonstrated by the previous sections of this
article, is a set of gendered assumptions that may inform a teachers'
pedagogy. Moreover it assumes two important conditions about
individual subjects and language: that is, it assumes that different
women occupy particular symbolic positions.s
Based on these two conditions, teachers cannot expect all women
to do (x) and all men to do (y). What we as teachers can do, however,
is challenge our students to consider the following pOSSibilities:
(1) to identity and analyze the positions from which we have
spoken, are speaking, and are spoken;
(2) to play with re-visioning these positions;
(3) to analyze academic discourse, recognizing how it silences
and is sustained by particular voices;
(4) to analyze when, why, and how we fall into dreams of a
common language, or silence, or playing it safe, etc;
(5) to articulate feminist definitions of writing classrooms,
students, teachers, etc., as well as analyze the power systems that
permeate these definitions;
(6) to analyze textual strategies used by women and men in
particular positions;
(7) to listen to the unconscious, recognizing that we can never
fully hear it;
(8) to listen simultaneously to the many voices that inform an
issue and critique the 'happy pluralism" that attempts to accept
all these voices;
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(9) to analyze 'the order of things' in order to contemplate the
possibility and feasibility of being 'dangerous'; and
(10) to make visible the functions of language in all of the
above possibilities.
.
Foregrounding such possibilities in the classroom may help students
and teachers articulate the limits and possibilities of their own
agencies. Such articulations may, in turn, help students and teachers
to understand Rich's persona in 'Sources XXII' who encourages us all
to identify, and write from, our own politics of location:
.. .1 think you thought
there was no such place for you,
and perhaps there was none then,
and perhaps there is none now;
but we will have to make it, we who
want an end to suffering,
who want to change the laws of history, if
we are not to give ourselves away.
(Your Native Land Your Life 24-28)
Perhaps not giving ourselves away means seeing past the assumed real
essentialisms that function in our daily lives (e.g., my student Janet's
father who, in one breath, offered to send her brother to medical
school and to find her a rich doctor). Perhaps not giving ourselves
away means seeing past the assumed nominal essentialisms in our daily
lives (e.g., Janet's father's claiming he was only joking as if such
naming of his actions could make his sexism less hurtful). Perhaps not
giving ourselves away means conceptualizing our politics of location as
an everchanging essence that constructs space for writerly agency.
And for feminist teachers, perhaps not giving ourselves or our students
away means seeing Rich's pOlitics of location as essential to pedagogy.
No'"
IFor Aristotle's discussion of substance and essence, see his Melaphysics. He divides
substance into four categories: "the essence and the universal and the genus are held to
be the substance of the particular, aod ... the substrate lis1 that of which the rest are
predicated" (I.VII.315, 17). He then defines "essence" as follows: "Your essence, Ihen,
is that which you are said to be of your own nature.... Hence the formula of the essence
of each thing is that which defines the term but does not contain it (I.VJJ.321).
2Locke posits a two-fold defini tion of real e.ssmce, i.e., that of '''which all natura) things
are made" and as "a real, but unknown, ronstitution of (a natural thing's] insensible parts"
(An Essay on Human Utukrslanding 1.27). He defines nominal essence as "so near a
connexio n (between the name and essence], that the name of any sort of thing cannot
be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence" (I. 27). He further
argues:
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That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with names
annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse
of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and
communication of their knowledge, which would advante but slowly were their
words and thoughts confined only to the particular. (1.29)
3Locke does not define real essence in terms of nominal essence as does Fuss.

According to Locke, "in a species of simple ideas and modes, [real and nominal essence]
are always the same; but in substances always quite different" (An Essay on Human
Understanding 1.29).
4Daly believes that a demystification of patriarchy is available to both women and men,
but in a move that gets her labelled a real essentialist radical lesbian separatist, she
unapologetically focuses on women's voyages. Why? She figures there are enough other
people in our culture to wony about men's (Beyond God the Father 8, 172-174).

5Rich concludes her "Notes toward a Politics of Location" by asking "Once again: Who
is we?" (231). The implied question is: what rs are erased by the we's of white
feminisms? Such a move complicates white feminist theories, ca lling into question their
assumptions, their claims, and their implications.

Krista Ratcliffe is an assistant professor of English at Marquelle University
in Milwaukee, WISconsin.
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Call for Manuscripts
Submissions to the 1994 Western Ohio Journal, "Assessing Student
Production/Achievement in the Language Arts" should be sent to:
Kathy A Kingston, Editor, Bellbrook High School, 3491 Upper
Bellbrook Road, Bellbrook Ohio 45305, by July 30, 1994. All
submissions will be considered, including poetry, art, or black/White
photography. If you would like to have your MS returned or would
like a reply, please supply SASE.
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